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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)! 
brought major changes in United States immigration policy. IRCA 
addresses the problem of increasing numbers of illegal aliens in 
three ways. First, the Act grants amnesty to certain aliens who have 
been in the United States illegally since January 1, 1982.2 Second, 
IRCA revises procedures for temporary entry into the United States 
for certain agricultural workers,3 and grants permanent residence 
to some of these workers.4 Third, the Act imposes sanctions on 
employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens.5 
This note focuses on one of IRCA's most controversial provi-
sions - the provision creating employer sanctions. Employers have 
opposed this provision because they believe it puts too great of a 
I P.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.) [hereinafter IRCAj. 
2 IRCA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (Supp. 1986). 
3 IRCA § 302,8 U.S.C. § 1210. 
4Id. 
5 IRCA § 101,8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
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burden on them. Civil rights advocates have similarly opposed the 
provision because they fear it will lead to increased employment 
discrimination against certain minorities. 
After two years, evidence of the effectiveness of employer sanc-
tions remains inconclusive, and the debate over this provision con-
tinues. This note contends that the social cost of applying employer 
sanctions far outweighs any effect the provision will have on illegal 
immigration. The sanctions, coupled with an unreliable and cum-
bersome system of verifying work eligibility, will promote discrimi-
nation against certain minorities and nationalities. Furthermore, 
employer sanctions will only minimally deter aliens from entering 
this country illegally, because other sections of the IRCA encourage 
illegal immigration. Thus, the overall effect of IRCA will be to 
perpetuate the permanent class of underground aliens in the 
United States, and to increase discriminatory employment practices 
against certain minorities and nationalities within the United States. 
Part II provides background information on how the immigra-
tion process in the United States works, and gives a brief history of 
the legislative history of immigration law, focusing on past efforts 
to impose sanctions on employers who hire illegal aliens. Part III 
addresses the possible impact of employer sanctions on employment 
discrimination. Part IV examines the effectiveness of IRCA in de-
terring illegal immigration. 
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
A. The Structure and Process of United States Immigration Law 
Before discussing specific provisions of IRCA, it is necessary to 
understand some general aspects of United States immigration law. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (IN A)6 is the prin-
cipal legislation setting out the current system of immigration in 
the United States. 7 Title I of the Act outlines the administrative 
duties of different governmental bodies. Title II contains numerical 
limits on the number of people allowed to immigrate to the United 
6 P.L. No. 82-414.66 Stat. 163, (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1982)) [here-
inafter INA]. 
7 Major amendments to the basic statute enacted in 1952 include: the Act of Sept. II, 
1957,7 Stat. 639; the Act of Oct. 20, 1976,90 Stat. 2703; the Act of Oct. 5, 1978,92 Stat. 
907; the Refugee Act of 1980, enacted Mar. 17, 1980,94 Stat. 102; and the Immigration 
and Nationality Amendments of 1981, enacted Dec. 29,1981,95 Stat. 1611. 
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States and establishes entry requirements for both immigrants and 
non-immigrants. Title III contains naturalization requirements. 
Most aspects of the immigration process are handled by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which is a branch of 
the Department of justice.8 However, the State Department issues 
visas to both immigrants and non-immigrants,9 and advises the INS 
on political issues involved in asylum and refugee petitions. lo Ad-
ditionally, the Labor Department, in a process called labor certifi-
cation, reviews applications of aliens applying to enter the United 
States to work. I I 
There are two categories of aliens seeking legal entry into the 
United States: immigrants and non-immigrants. Immigrants are 
commonly defined as aliens who intend to stay permanently in the 
United States. 12 The IN A places quota limits on the number of 
aliens allowed to immigrate,13 and establishes a seven category pref-
erence system which determines an immigrant's place on the visa 
waiting list. 14 If the number of aliens in the preference categories 
is less than the yearly quota, then non-preference aliens are allowed 
to imllligrate.15 
Non-immigrants plan to return to their home country after 
visiting, studying or working in the United States for a limited 
period of time. 16 There are currently thirteen categories of non-
immigrants, and each category has different requirements for ob-
taining permission to enter the United States. 17 These aliens are not 
subject to the numerical limitations placed on immigrants,18 but 
they must leave the country when their visas expire or they may be 
deported by the INS.19 
8 8 U .S.C. § 1103 (1982). 
9 INA § 104.8 U.S.C. § 1104. 
10 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1987). 
118 U.S.C. § 1184(c); 8 u.s.c. § 1182(a)(l4). 
12 C. GORDON AND E.G. GORDON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 2.4 (1986). How-
ever, the Immigration and Nationality Act defines immigrants as "every alien except an alien" 
within one of the special non-immigrant classes. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(lS). Thus technically, the 
law presumes that every alien is an immigrant until an immigration official is satisfied that 
the alien is entitled to non-immigrant status. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b). 
13 However, there is no numerical limit on the number of unmarried children less than 
twenty-one years old or spouses of United States citizens or legal permanent residents allowed 
to immigrate. 8 u.s.c. § 11Sl. 
14 8 U.S.C. § 11S3(a)(I)-(6). 
15 8 U .s.c. § 11S3(a)(7). 
16 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 12, at § 2.4. 
17 INA § 101(1)(lS), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(lS). 
18 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 12, at § 2.4. 
19 [d. at § 2.S. 
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B. Historical Background of Immigration Law and Employer Sanctions 
The United States placed few restrictions on the type or num-
ber of people who could enter its borders during the 1700's and 
early 1800's.20 Congress imposed the first real limits on immigration 
shortly after the Civil War.21 As the number of immigrants increased 
through the 1800's, and the composition of immigrants shifted from 
Western Europeans to less educated Eastern Europeans, Asians, 
and Irish Catholics, resentment towards and suspicion of immi-
grants heightened.22 The depressed economy of the country in the 
1870's "was blamed on aliens who were accused of driving wages to 
a substandard level as well as taking away jobs that 'belonged' to 
white people."23 This growing sentiment expressed itself through 
laws restricting the type of people allowed to immigrate to the 
United States. For example, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
suspended all immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years, and 
prohibited Chinese immigrants already in the United States from 
becoming citizens.24 Other laws enacted during this time period 
excluded convicts, prostitutes, lunatics, "public charges"25 and "idi-
otS."26 
Congress passed a major piece of immigration legislation in 
1917 (the 1917 Act) which codified all existing immigration laws, 
and imposed new restrictions on immigration.27 The 1917 Act at-
tempted to stem the flow of immigrants from southern and eastern 
Europe by making illiterates ineligible to immigrate.28 The legisla-
tion also created an "Asiatic barred zone designed to exclude Asians 
completely from immigrating to the U.S."29 Additionally, the 1917 
Act attempted to control the numbers of illegal aliens within the 
country - which had increased correspondingly with the length of 
the list of people ineligible to immigrate legally - by prohibiting 
20 D. WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 4 (1984). 
21 Id., at 6. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL 
RIGHTS IsSUES IN IMMIGRATION 7 (1980) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT]. 
22 See J. PATTERSON, AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 15 (1976). 
23 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 8. 
24Id. 
25 A public charge is someone who is not financially independent or able to work, who 
would have to be supported by the government if allowed to immigrate. 
26 WEISSBRODT, supra note 20, at 6-9. 
27 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 9. 
28Id. 
29Id. 
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the acts of harboring, transporting or smuggling illegal aliens into 
the United States.30 
Because of the Supreme Court's ruling in U.S. v. Evans,3l the 
provision prohibiting the act of harboring, transporting or smug-
gling illegal aliens proved to be ineffective in controlling illegal 
immigration. In Evans, the Court held that because of the wording 
of the 1917 Act, only the smuggling or transporting of illegal aliens 
was a punishable offense; therefore those who harbored or con-
cealed illegal aliens could not be punished under the 1917 Act. 32 
Because employers could not be punished for hiring illegal aliens, 
they continued to do so. Consequently, the number of illegal aliens, 
especially from Mexico, continued to increase. 
As their numbers increased, the quality of the living conditions 
for illegal immigrants deteriorated. The Mexican government be-
came concerned about the squalid living conditions of its citizens 
and the low pay they received while living and working illegally in 
the United States.33 President Truman also became concerned about 
the negative effect that these illegal aliens would have on United 
States workers' wages and living conditions. 34 The President joined 
together with the Mexican government to exert pressure on Con-
gress to amend the harboring and transporting provision of the 
1917 Act. 35 
President Truman advocated that a provision imposing sanc-
tions on employers who hire illegal aliens should be added to the 
harboring sanctions of the 1917 Act. 36 In 1952, Senator Douglas 
introduced such a provision to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA),37 which was the immigration legislation under consideration 
at that time. This amendment was overwhelmingly defeated after a 
heated debate. 38 In fact, due to a perceived lack of temporary 
30 Act of Feb. 5.1917,39 Stat. 874. 
31 U.S. v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948). 
32Id. at 495. 
33 SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 38 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter TEMPORARY WORKER PRO-
GRAMS]. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36Id. 
37 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [hereinafter INA] was a major piece of 
legislation which set out the United States immigration system. See supra notes 6-7, and 
accompanying text. 
38 TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS, supra note 33, at 40. 
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agricultural workers in certain parts of the country, the final version 
of the Act explicitly exempted employers from sanctions for har-
boring illegal aliens in a provision which has come to be known as 
the "Texas Proviso. "39 
Until IRCA was passed, the Texas Proviso gave employers the 
benefit of hiring illegal aliens at less than minimum wage rates 
without being subject to the harsh penalties imposed on others who 
assisted illegal aliens. 40 Under the INA, while illegal aliens discov-
ered at a place of employment faced deportation, the only punish-
ment an employer faced was the loss of the employee. Due to the 
low risk involved, employers continued to hire illegal aliens, thus 
providing an incentive for people from economically depressed 
countries to continue to enter the United States illegally. 
C. The Legislative History of IRCA 
IRCA is the first major reform of United States' immigration 
law since Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
The impetus for the reforms contained in IRCA began in 1971 
when the Subcommittee on Immigration of the House Judiciary 
Committee held hearings on the problem of undocumented aliens.41 
The subcommittee concluded that illegal aliens had a substantial 
adverse impact on the United States economy and labor market, 
and that legislation "to assure the orderly entry of immigrants into 
this country" and to protect this country's own labor market was 
needed.42 
39 SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY TO THE CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
473 (1981) [hereinafter SELECT COMMISSION REPORT]. Records of the congressional debate 
over the Texas Proviso indicate that the provision was only meant to exempt employers who 
unknowingly hired illegal aliens. Employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens were supposed 
to be subject to penalties under the provision. 123 CONGo REC. 794 (1952). Interestingly, the 
INS has interpreted the provision to give "full authority to employers to contract for and 
use illegal entrants with impugnity." Schwarz, Employer Sanctions Laws, Worker Identification 
Systems, and Undocumented Aliens: The State Experience and Federal Proposals, 19 STAN. J. INT'L. 
1. 371, 374 (1983) (quoting Greene, Public Agency Distortion of Congressional Will: Federal Policy 
Toward Non-Resident Labor, 40 GEO. WASH. 1. REV. 440, 454 (1972)). 
40 The INA provides penalties of up to $2000 and up to five years imprisonment for 
each offense of smuggling, harboring or transporting an illegal alien. INA § 274, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324. 
41 H.R. REP. No. 682(1), 99th Congo 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5656. 
42Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at 3). 
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During the 1970's, immigration reform bills were introduced 
into the House and Senate almost every year. 43 Because of the 
controversial nature of the proposed reforms, most bills were either 
held up in lengthy committee hearings, or did not pass if actually 
considered by the House or the Senate. In 1978, President Carter 
attempted to focus further attention on the issue of illegal aliens by 
establishing the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy (the Commission). The Commission held extensive hearings 
on immigration problems over the span of several years and issued 
its final report of findings and recommendations in 1981.44 The 
Commission's report underscored the economic and social impor-
tance of controlling the flow of illegal immigrants into the United 
States. 45 Among its major recommendations on how to control il-
legal immigration was the imposition of sanctions against employers 
that knowingly hire illegal aliens. 46 
The bills containing the basic structure of IRCA were first 
introduced to Congress in 1982.47 For almost six years, Congress 
debated and considered these reforms under legislation commonly 
referred to as the "Simpson-Mazzoli Bills."48 The Act was contro-
versial, and several groups were particularly concerned about the 
employer sanctions provisions. Civil rights groups were against sanc-
tions because they feared that they would result in employers re-
fusing to hire recent legal immigrants, or anyone who looked for-
eign or spoke with an accent. 49 Because of the lack of a standard 
and reliable system to determine employment eligibility, employers 
did not want to shoulder the responsibility of trying to determine 
whether or not a potential employee would be eligible to work. 50 
43 See id. at 52-53. 
44 The report included a final report, and ten supplementary volumes of appendixes. 
SELECT COMMISION REPORT, supra note 39. 
45 See SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 39, at Part ILB.1. 
461d. 
47 Identical bills were introduced on March 17, 1982, by Rep. Romano Mazzoli and Sen. 
Alan Simpson. H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
48 5 IMMIGR. L. REP. 73 (1986). 
49 Hearings on H.R. 1510 before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House 
Committee on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1983) (statement of Arnoldo 
S. Torres, National Executive Director, League of United Latin American Citizens); and id. 
at 41,43 (statement of E. Richard Larson, Attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union) 
[hereinafter Employment Hearings]. See SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 39, app. h at 
180 (summary of statement of Juan Soliz, Chicago Legal Services for Immigrants). 
50 See SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 39, Appendix H, at 178-79 (summary of 
statement of Richard Gaven, National Restaurant Association). See id. at 250-51. 
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Congress attempted to address both of these concerns. By re-
quiring employers to obtain uniform documentation and keep rec-
ords on all employees, regardless of nationality, Congress hoped to 
eliminate potential discrimination problems.5l As an additional safe-
guard, Congress included in IRCA a prohibition against discrimi-
natory employment practices, and created a Special Counsel to 
investigate charges of discrimination. 52 To satisfy employers' con-
cerns, Congress stipulated that an employer who complies with 
record keeping and documentation requirements will not be fined 
provided that any document accepted by the employer "reasonably 
appears on its face to be genuine."53 
D. Employer Requirements Under IRCA 
IRCA prohibits employers from knowingly hiring illegal al-
iens.54 The legislation requires that employers verify the work eli-
gibility of every employee hired after November 6, 1986.55 Regu-
lations issued by the INS under authority of the Act require 
employers to complete an 1-9 form.56 The form lists documents that 
prove employment eligibility, and the employer must indicate which 
documents the employee presented, and testify that the documents 
were valid. 57 IRCA contains a "good faith" clause providing that an 
employer will not be fined for knowingly employing an illegal alien 
if the documents presented by the employee look valid. 58 The em-
ployer could be fined however, if the documents presented are 
obviously false. 59 
The Act requires employers to keep a completed 1-9 form for 
every employee for at least "three years after the date of hire," or 
"one year after the date of termination of employment, whichever 
is later."6o The form must be presented to INS officials upon their 
51 See H.R. REP. No. 682(1), 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 56 reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5660. 
52 1RCA § 102, 8 U.S.c. § 1324b. 
531RCA § 102, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5)(l). See H.R. REP. No. 682(1), 99th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 56 reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 5660-61. 
54 1RCA § 102,8 U.S.c. § 1324a(1). 
55 1RCA § 101(a)(3). 
56 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2.A. 
57 DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. M-274 HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYEES 3 (l987)(published in 
52 Fed. Reg. 21,454). 
58 1RCA § 102, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5)(l). 
59 H.R. REP. No. 682(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN NEWS 5649, 5661. 
60 1RCA § 101(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3). 
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request, and will apparently be used to determine whether an em-
ployer has knowingly hired an illegal alien.6l Employers are not 
required to keep copies of the documents they rely on to determine 
an employee's work eligibility, but obviously, keeping such copies 
"provides strong support for the employer's" decision, and "makes 
good sense."62 
Both civil and criminal penalties are created by the Act. The 
INS is authorized to issue civil penalties ranging from $100 to 
$1,000 for failure to comply with record keeping requirements,63 
and penalties from $250 to $10,000 for each illegal alien hired by 
the employer.64 Before imposing civil penalties, the INS must issue 
a Notice of Intent to Fine the employer, and the employer then has 
30 days to request a hearing before an administrative law judge 
(ALJ}.65 If the employer does not contest the notice within 30 days, 
then he or she automatically receives a fine. 66 Additionally, an em-
ployer could face up to $3,000 or six months imprisonment as a 
criminal penalty for continuing a "pattern or practice" of knowingly 
employing illegal aliens.67 
The Act also prohibits discriminatory practices in hiring based 
on national origin,68 and authorizes the creation of a Special Counsel 
for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices to investi-
gate charges of discrimination.69 A person who believes she or he 
has been discriminated against may file a claim with the Special 
Counsel, which investigates the charge and files a complaint with 
an ALJ if the charge is justified. 70 If the Special Counsel fails to file 
a complaint within 120 days, the person charging discrimination 
may file a complaint directly with an ALJ.7l The complaint will 
61 Since employers are not required to keep copies of documents, they can easily complete 
the form without actually checking documentation. It is therefore difficult to know how 
useful this form will be in catching employers who hire illegal aliens. However, penalties can 
be imposed on employers who do not comply with the record keeping requirements, even if 
they have not hired illegal aliens. Additionally, when the INS discovers an alien without 
proper documentation working somewhere, the form could be used to show their lack of 
good faith in completing the form. 
62 5 IMMIGR. L. REP. 76 (1986). 
63 IRCA § 101(e)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5). 
64 IRCA § 101(e)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A). 
65 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(c). 
66Id. 
67 IRCA § 101(f)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f). 
68 IRCA § 102,8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(I). 
69 IRCA § 102,8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c). 
70 IRCA § 102, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(2). 
71 IRCA § 102,8 U.S.c. § 1324b(d)(2). 
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initiate an administrative hearing, where the ALJ is authorized to 
impose a civil penalty, and award back pay and attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party where appropriate. 72 
III. THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMIN A TION 
IRCA prohibits "unfair immigration-related employment prac-
tices," which are defined as "discrimination against any individual, 
other than an illegal alien in the hiring of an individual for em-
ployment or the discharging of an individual from employment 
because of the individual's national origin, or citizenship status."73 
This prohibition against discrimination does not apply to employers 
of three or fewer employees, or to discrimination based on citizen-
ship "which is otherwise required in order to comply with the law, 
... required by a ... government contract, or which the Attorney 
General determines to be essential for an employer to do business 
with an agency or department of Federal, State or local govern-
ment," or to discrimination which is covered under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.74 
The effectiveness of the antidiscrimination provision is doubt-
ful for two reasons. First, INS raids in the past have often focused 
on employers with large numbers of Hispanic or other minority 
workers. The raids tended to be disruptive, time consuming and 
costly to employers in terms of lost work hours. Now that employers 
face civil and criminal penalties for hiring illegal aliens, as well as 
the threat of costly and time consuming INS raids, many employers 
may decide to hire only workers that do not appear to be foreign 
rather than run the risk of drawing the attention of the INS. Sec-
ond, despite evidence of widespread discriminatory employment 
practices induced by the threat of employer sanctions, few people 
have filed discrimination complaints against employers. Since em-
ployers face harsh consequences for employing illegal aliens, and 
face little chance of being penalized for discrimination, employers 
will continue to discriminate against foreign-looking people. 
A. INS Investigation Tactics Discourage Employers from Hiring 
Minorities 
Courts generally uphold the authority of INS officials to inter-
rogate any person at his or her place of employment if the INS has 
72 IRCA § 102,8 u.s.c. § 1324b(e)(l). 
73 IRCA § 102,8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(I). 
74 IRCA § 10 I, 8 U .S.C. § 1324b(a)(2). 
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a reasonable suspicion that the person is an illegal alien, and if the 
employer consents.75 Additionally, the INS contends that its agents 
can conduct extensive searches at business establishments without 
an employer's permission if they obtain a general search warrant.76 
The courts have not conclusively ruled on this issue.77 Typically, 
INS officials target their searches, or raids, at businesses with high 
numbers of Hispanic and West Indian employees.78 During a raid, 
officials roam through the facility, stopping and questioning those 
employees who look "foreign," which often means Hispanic. 79 Em-
ployers desiring to avoid these time consuming and disruptive raids 
may decide that the best way to do so is not to hire "foreign-looking" 
people.80 
A good illustration of the discriminatory investigative practices 
used by the INS is "Project Jobs." This operation, which took place 
from April 26 to April 30, 1982, in nine cities across the United 
States, was designed to locate and arrest illegal aliens who held high 
paying positions that could be filled by United States citizens.8l Of 
the 5,440 aliens arrested during the operation, 4,900 were Mexican 
nationals, while only one citizen each from Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia were arrested.82 The average salary of 
those arrested was approximately $190 a week.83 
The threat of INS raids, now coupled with IRCA's stiff sanc-
tions, are strong incentives for employers to discriminate against 
foreign-looking people in the hiring process. Additionally, the lack 
of an accurate, quick way to verify an employee'S eligibility will 
further encourage employment discrimination. As discussed in Sec-
75 See Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864; 
Ojeda-Vinales v. INS, 523 F.2d 286, 287 (2d Cir. 1975); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666, 
667 (2d Cir. 1975). 
76 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 88-90. 
77Id. at 85. 
7BId. 
79Id. 
80 See Employment Hearings, supra note 49, at 21 (statement of Arnoldo S. Torres). 
81Id. at 42 (statement of E. Richard Larson, ACLU). 
82Id. 
83 J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR: THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICA 244 (1983). Operation Jobs has been criticized as an example of the ineffective 
investigation tactics used by the INS. Instead of identifying illegal aliens in high-paying jobs 
that could be filled by unemployed American citizens, the INS spends its resources raiding 
"steel mills, light factories, shoemakers, fisheries, canners [and] poultry farms," which tend 
to employ uneducated and low-paid Mexican workers. Id. at 245. The illegal immigrants who 
pose the biggest threat to the American labor market are the well-educated "Asians, Euro-
peans, and Middle Easterners" who work in "banks and brokerage houses and aerospace 
firms," and get into the United States by using false documentation or overstaying a legitimate 
visa. Id. at 245. 
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tion II, IRCA requires that an employee present documentation to 
an employer establishing both the identity and the work eligibility 
of the employee, and the employer must verify the validity of the 
documents.84 Although the provision contains a good faith clause,85 
many employers may find it easier not to hire a person that could 
draw the attention of the INS, despite the validity of their docu-
ments.86 
B. Employers Face Little Risk of Being Penalized for Employment 
Discrimination Under IRCA 
The imposition of employer sanctions, the investigative tactics 
of the INS, and the lack of an easy system of verification of em-
ployment eligibility all provide strong incentives for employers not 
to hire certain groups of people. The antidiscrimination provisions 
of IRCA were included to counteract these incentives. Unfortu-
nately, despite evidence of employment discrimination related to 
IRCA, few individuals have filed complaints against employers. Ad-
ditionally, under the Reagan administration's interpretation of the 
Act, the standard of proof required to show discrimination is dif-
ficult for complainants to meet. Thus, even if the number of com-
plaints filed increases, few complainants would actually prevail in a 
dispute. The low risk employers face of being penalized for discrim-
ination under IRCA will do little to counteract the Act's strong 
incentives to discriminate against certain minority groups. 
Few people have filed discrimination complaints under IRCA. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) is required to issue a yearly 
report on the number of discrimination complaints filed under 
IRCAY The GAO reported that as of September 1987, only sixty-
seven IRCA-related employment discrimination complaints were 
filed with federal agencies.88 By September 1988, the number of 
complaints filed increased to 434. 89 The Office of Special Counsel, 
84 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
85 Supra note 58; H.R. REP. No. 99-682(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5661. 
86 Joint Hearings on the Antidiscrimination Provision of H.R. 3080, Before the House Subcom-
mittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law and the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration 
and Refugee Policy, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. III (1982) (statement of Rep. Robert Garcia). 
87 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING 
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AFTER SECOND YEAR 31 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter GAO 1988 REPORT]. 
88 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING 
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AFTER ONE YEAR 31 (Nov. 1987) [hereinafter GAO 1987 REPORT]. 
89 GAO 1988 REPORT, supra note 87, at 40. 
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which received 286 of these 434 complaints, initially estimated that 
only 180 complaints would be filed in 1988.90 The actual number 
of complaints filed in 1988 was fifty-nine percent higher than orig-
inally estimated.91 Despite this figure, the GAO concluded that the 
number of complaints filed did not indicate a "pattern of discrimi-
nation."92 
Other figures indicate that this conclusion may be misguided. 
For example, in 1987 the GAO reported that as of September 1, 
1987, the city of Chicago had received thirty IRCA-related charges 
of discrimination.93 As of March 1, 1987, the New York State In-
teragency Task Force on Immigration had documented sixty-four 
cases of IRCA-related discrimination.94 Additionally, the Office of 
Special Counsel has "identified about 500 job advertisements in 
newspapers containing possible discriminatory wording, such as lim-
iting which work authorization documents are needed for the 1-9 
or limiting employment to U.S. citizens only."95 
The GAO's 1988 report96 contains even more alarming statis-
tics. A survey conducted by the GAO found that approximately 
sixteen percent of responding employers admitted to engaging in 
discriminatory practices such as "asking only foreign-looking per-
sons for work authorization or hiring only U.S. citizens."97 These 
facts indicate that IRCA may be encouraging employment discrim-
ination, but that the victims of such discrimination are not seeking 
redress through the channels provided in IRCA. 
Even if more individuals filed discrimination complaints, under 
the Reagan administration's interpretation of the provision, few 
complainants could prevail. Upon signing IRCA, President Reagan 
urged that the Act's antidiscrimination provision be interpreted to 
require claimants to prove an employer "knowingly and intention-
ally" discriminated against them.98 The Justice Department has fol-
lowed this interpretation.99 Under IRCA, a complainant must pres-
ent evidence that an employer specifically intended to discriminate 
90 [d. at 43. 
91 [d. 
92 [d. at 39. 
93 GAO 1987 REPORT, supra note 88, at 35. 
94[d. 
95 [d. at 34. 
96 GAO 1988 REPORT, supra note 87. 
97 [d. at 46. 
98 Statement by Ronald Reagan upon signing S. 1200, 22 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 
1543 (Nov. 10, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5856-1, 5856-2. 
9928 C.F.R. § 44.200(a)(l987). 
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against an employee or applicant because of that person's race or 
nationality. The employer can refute this evidence by providing any 
rational reason for not hiring the individual.lOo Absent a showing 
of intent, an employer is not even obligated to give a reason for not 
hiring the complainant. lol 
This standard is essentially the same as one of the standards 
used in employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1965 (Title VII).102 Under the "disparate treat-
ment" theory, a plaintiff must prove intentional discriminatory 
treatment by an employer, and refute all of the employer's articu-
lated nondiscriminatory reasons for the treatment. 103 The standard 
used in disparate treatment cases is similar to the standard for IRCA 
cases which President Reagan advocated. The second standard in 
Title VII cases is the "disparate impact" theory. The disparate im-
pact theory focuses on the "consequences of employment prac-
tices."lo4 Therefore, the intent of an employer is irrelevant. lo5 To 
prevail under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must use statis-
tics to establish that a "facially neutral employment practice has a 
substantial disparate impact on a protected class of which he is a 
member." 106 
Generally, it is easier for a plaintiff to prevail under a disparate 
impact theory, because "it does not require a plaintiff to prove that 
an employer acted with discriminatory intent in [making] an em-
ployment decision."lo7 Under the Reagan administration's interpre-
tation of IRCA, plaintiffs could not use this theory. IDS Evidence that 
an employer consistently hires white applicants over more qualified 
immigrants or foreign-looking applicants would not be sufficient to 
show discrimination. 109 
Preliminary evidence shows that employers are using discrim-
inatory practices in response to the threat of employer sanctions. 
Additionally, there is little incentive for employers to stop discrim-
100 Statement by Ronald Reagan upon signing S. 1200,22 supra note 98. 
101Id. 
102 52 Fed. Reg. 37,402, 37,404 (1987). Wall Street Journal, Oct. 7,1987, at 14, col. 1. 
103 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). 
104 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
105Id. 
1116 Note, The Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices Provision: A Modicum of Pro-
tection Against National Origin and Citizenship Status Discrimination, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1025, 
1043 (1987). 
107Id. at 1042. 
108 52 Fed. Reg. 37,402, 37,404-05 (1987). 
10gId. 
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inating because few victims have filed complaints. Furthermore, 
since the standard of proof is so difficult to meet in these cases, few 
complainants will prevail in these cases. 
IV. IRCA's EFFECTIVENESS IN CONTROLLING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
One of the primary purposes of IRCA is to "control illegal 
immigration in the U.S."IIO "The principal means ... [of doing so] 
... is through employer sanctions."111 The rationale behind the 
imposition of sanctions is that "[e]mployment is the magnet that 
attracts aliens [to the United States] illegally." 112 However, the ef-
fectiveness of employer sanctions may be negated by other provi-
sions of IRCA, and by economic and political factors in other coun-
tries which continue to encourage illegal immigration into the 
United States. 
Social scientists have identified two categories of factors that 
encourage immigration. I 13 "Push" factors are circumstances within 
a country that cause people to emigrate, such as political unrest, 
large-scale unemployment, a repressive government, and high pop-
ulation growth rates. 114 "Pull" factors are circumstances within a 
country that attract people to that country, such as political and 
economic stability, a high standard of living, and the availability of 
jobs. 115 The stronger these factors are, the greater the number of 
people that want to immigrate to the country with the pull factors. 116 
If legal channels cannot accommodate the number of people desir-
ing to immigrate, then illegal immigration will increase.ll7 
Employer sanctions attempt to lessen the strength of the pull 
factors which attract people to the United States. I IS However, push 
factors in other countries, as well as IRCA's legalization, registry, 
and seasonal agricultural worker programs, continue to encourage 
illegal immigration. Additionally, a growing black market has made 
110 H.R. REP. No. 682(1) 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5649. 
III Id. at 46. 
112Id. 
113 TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS, supra note 33, at 106-107. MEXICAN MIGRATION 
PROJECT, U. OF ARIZ., MEXICAN MIGRATION 22 (T. Weaver & T. Downing ed. 1976) [here-
inafter MEXICAN MIGRATION]. See EHRLICH, THE GOLDEN DOOR 10 (1979). 
114 MEXICAN MIGRATION, supra note 113, at 22. 
115Id. 
1161d. 
117 See id. at 22-24. 
liS See H.R. REP. No. 682(1) 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5650. 
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it relatively easy for aliens to obtain false documents needed for 
work eligibility.llg When all of these factors are combined with the 
extremely low probability that the INS can effectively monitor every 
employer in the country,120 aliens have little incentive to stop enter-
ing the United States illegally. 
A. Push Factors in Other Countries Encourage Illegal Immigration to 
the United States 
Economic and political problems within a country often cause 
large numbers of people to emigrate to places with better economies 
and less political strife. For example, almost 200,000 people left 
Ireland in the five years following the potato famine of 1864. 121 
The present economic and political climate of Mexico - the source 
of a large number of apprehended illegal aliens in the United 
States l22 - similarly pushes people to the United States. 
In 1982, Mexico "began a slide into a severe recession that left 
rising unemployment and declining real wages in its wake."123 Dur-
ing that year, unemployment rates doubled in Mexico's three major 
metropolitan areas. 124 By 1983, average real earnings had declined 
to seventy percent of the 1981 average real earnings. 125 The Mex-
ican government has been beset by rising inflation within the coun-
try, and the decreasing value of oil in international markets. As the 
government attempts to deal with its large debt burden, it has 
continued to employ austerity measures on its citizens. 126 
The House Judiciary Committee, in its report on IRCA, rec-
ognized that employer sanctions alone will not completely eliminate 
119 Wall Street Journal, Sept. IS, 1987, at I, col. 1. 
120 The General Accounting Office reports that by the end of Fiscal Year 1988 the INS 
will create 500 new positions specifically dedicated to investigating compliance with IRCA. 
GAO 1987 REPORT, supra note 88, at 27. Additionally, the INS plans to conduct 20,000 1-9 
inspections using the Investigations and Border Patrol, and the Department of Labor plans 
to conduct 60,000 1-9 inspections during Fiscal Year 1988. Id. at 26-27. However, the INS 
sent copies of the Employer Handbook which detailed IRCA's new provisions to over 7 
million employers. Id. at 26. Thus, despite the seemingly large number of inspections that 
the federal government is planning to conduct, the INS will only be inspecting a small 
percentage of the number of employers in the United States. 
121 EHRLICH, THE GOLDEN DOOR 24 (1979). 
122 Of the 1,767,400 deportable aliens apprehended by the INS in 1986, 1,671,458 were 
Mexican citizens. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 1986 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION 
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 96 (1986). 
123 P. GREGORY, THE MYTH OF MARKET FAILURE 269 (1986). 
124Id. at 271. 
125Id. at 272. 
126 MEXICAN MIGRATION, supra note 113, at 102. 
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illegal immigration. The Committee stated that "[a]s long as there 
is an economic imbalance between the sending countries and the 
United States, the pressure to migrate to this country will con-
tinue."127 In addition to employer sanctions, the Judiciary Commit-
tee advocated "generous bilateral programs to assist Mexico in re-
ducing the economic pressures to emigrate - temporarily or 
permanently - to the U.S."128 
B. Other Provisions of IRCA Encourage Illegal Immigration 
The purpose of employer sanctions is to discourage illegal im-
migration. 129 However, by making exceptions to previous immigra-
tion laws, the legalization program, the registry program, and the 
new seasonal agricultural workers program all implicitly encourage 
illegal immigration. These programs will act as pull factors, making 
illegal immigration to the United States more attractive. The effec-
tiveness of employer sanctions in counteracting these pull factors 
will depend upon how strictly and how often the provision is en-
forced, and upon increased enforcement and inspections along the 
United States border and at ports of entry. 
The problem of illegal aliens living within the United States 
can be approached in several ways. First, the status quo can be 
maintained. Second, the internal enforcement of immigration laws 
can be intensified, and apprehended illegal aliens deported. Third, 
Congress can admit to past failures in the enforcement of immigra-
tion laws and legalize those illegal aliens within the United States, 
and concentrate resources on keeping new illegal aliens from en-
tering the country. 
As previously discussed, the United States' past meager efforts 
at controlling illegal immigration has depressed wages and in-
creased unemployment in areas of the country with high concen-
trations of illegal aliens. 13o The second approach was rejected by 
Congress in discussions about immigration because it would be too 
costly and inhumane to uproot people who have become fully in-
tegrated into American society.131 Thus, in reforming immigration 
law, through IRCA, Congress adopted the third approach. 
127 H.R. REP. No. 682(1) 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5657. 
128 [d. 
129 Supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
130 See supra note 127, at 47. 
131 [d. at 49. 
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The legalization program authorizes the grant of legal per-
manent residence to eligible illegal aliens. To be eligible, an alien 
must have lived illegally within the United States since January 1, 
1982.132 An alien who has legally resided in the United States since 
1982 would not be eligible for legalization. An alien who legally 
resided in the United States in 1982, and later became illegal be-
cause his or her visa expired, would also not be eligible for legali-
zation. Aliens must have applied for legalization before May 4, 1988 
to be eligible, and they must have documentation proving their 
continuous presence in the United States. 133 
Proponents of the legalization program believe that it is a com-
passionate way to deal with illegal aliens who have "set down roots" 
in the United States, and "become productive members of American 
society."134 Opponents argue, however, that under the program, 
those willing to break the law to enter the United States illegally are 
given preference over those "would-be immigrants who have waited 
patiently to come here."135 Because the program "is unfair to [peo-
ple] who have respected the legal immigration system," it will attract 
"even more illegal migrants in the belief that they would somehow 
secure legal status now or in the future."136 Thus, the legalization 
program may encourage people to enter the United States illegally 
despite the difficulty they may encounter in finding employment 
once they arrive. 
The registry program is similar to the legalization program, in 
that it grants legal permanent residence to aliens who have lived in 
the United States since January 1, 1972. 137 However, the registry 
program grants legal permanent residency to both illegal and legal 
aliens. Additionally, the process of obtaining legal status through 
the registry program is less lengthy and complex than the process 
under the legalization program. 13S Like the legalization program, 
132 IRCA § 201,8 U.S.C. § 1255a. 
133 Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(a) (1987). 
134 H.R. REP. No. 682(1) 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5709. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. 
137 The registry program was first created in 1952 when Congress gave the Department 
of Justice discretion to grant permanent residence to aliens that had continuously lived in 
the United States since June 30, 1948. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 249. See 
GORDON & GORDON, supra note 12, at § 7.5. IRCA updated the cutoff date to Jan. I, 1972. 
IRCA § 201, 8 U.s.c. 1255a. 
138 Under the legalization program, aliens are first given temporary legal resident status. 
8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a). After one year they can apply for permanent resident status, which can 
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registry gives preference to aliens residing within the United States 
over those waiting to immigrate. Thus, registry may also encourage 
people to enter the United States illegally in hopes of evading 
authorities long enough to obtain legal residence. 
IRCA contains several provisions concerning seasonal agricul-
tural workers. The Act creates a new non-immigrant category, called 
the H2-A category, specifically for agricultural workers desiring to 
work in the United States during harvest seasons. 139 Additionally, 
the Act wili allow up to 350,000 aliens who can prove they per-
formed agricultural services for at least ninety days between May 
1, 1985 and May 1, 1986 to be granted temporary resident status. 140 
Those aliens may then obtain legal permanent resident status after 
one year. 141 
The United States and several European countries created sim-
ilar temporary worker programs during wartime or post-war labor 
shortages. 142 Historians who have analyzed these past programs 
have identified several factors as crucial to the success of these 
programs. 143 First, a country must make a concerted effort to find 
illegal aliens and keep them out of the country.144 Second, the 
number of aliens allowed into the country through legal channels 
must be realistic in meeting the labor needs of the country. 145 Third, 
the legal procedure should be fairly simple, and not involve a great 
deal of paper work. 146 Most countries which failed to take these 
factors into account when instituting temporary worker programs 
experienced an increase in the number of illegal aliens. 147 
be granted eighteen months after the alien gains temporary resident status, if the alien meets 
certain requirements, including a minimal understanding of English and of United States 
history and government. 8 u.s.c. § l255a(b). Under the registry program, an alien is im-
mediately granted permanent resident status, and the program does not contain any language 
or history or civic knowledge requirements. Registry is a discretionary form of relief, because 
the INS can decide not togrant someone resident status. Legalization is a mandatory form 
of relief because the INS must legalize an alien who meets the requirements under the 
statute. GORDON & GORDON, supra note 12, at § 7.5b. Thus, the individual circumstances of 
each alien should be taken into account when deciding to apply under the legalization 
program or the registry program. 
IlY IRCA § 30 I (a), 8 U .S.c. §§ 110 I (a), 12l6(a). 
140 IRCA § 302,8 U.S.c. § 121O(a). 
141 !d. 
142 See TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS, supra note 33, at 6 and 87-95. 
1431d. at 87. 
IH Id. 
14sld. 
14bld. 
1471d. 
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Past United States temporary agricultural worker programs 
have usually stimulated illegal immigration. The United States in-
stituted its first major temporary worker program in 1917. 148 This 
program allowed workers into the country solely to perform agri-
cultural services and railroad labor. 149 An employer applied for such 
workers through the Department of Labor, and had to pick up the 
workers at the Mexican border and pay for their return to Mex-
ico. 150 Employees and their families were given cards, which iden-
tified them as participants in the temporary worker program. 151 
Although workers could change employers, they were only allowed 
to hold agricultural or railroad jobS. 152 
Due to the amount of time, money and effort needed to obtain 
workers through the program, employers viewed using illegal aliens 
as the more attractive alternative. 153 Additionally, employers who 
did participate in the program were lax in keeping records, and 
often allowed workers to "desert in droves" once their work was 
complete, rather than pay for their return to Mexico. 154 Conse-
quently, in 1921, of the 72,862 aliens admitted through the program 
between 1917 and 1921,21,400 had deserted their employers and 
were presumed to be living in the United States illegally.155 
The second major temporary worker program sponsored by 
the United States was the Bracero program. 156 This program ran 
from 1942 to 1964, and its success in diverting the flow of immi-
grants into legal channels varied. In response to the Mexican gov-
ernment's concern over the discrimination and abuse Mexicans suf-
fered during the 1917 program, the Bracero program protected 
Mexican workers by requiring minimum wages and setting stan-
dards for living accommodations. 157 At its inception, the Bracero 
program stimulated illegal immigration, because more Mexicans 
desired to immigrate than were legally allowed. 158 Additionally, 
farmers disliked the added worker protections, and found it 
148 [d. at 6. 
149 [d. 
150 [d. at 9-11. 
151 [d. at 9. 
152 [d. 
153 [d. at 11. 
154 [d. 
155 [d. 
156 [d. at 17. 
157 EHRLICH, THE GOLDEN DOOR 212 (1979). 
158 TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS, supra note 33, at 26. 
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cheaper and easier to hire illegal aliens. 159 Consequently, illegal 
immigration continued to rise until Congress increased border en-
forcement, and expanded the numbers allowed in under the pro-
gram in the mid-1950s. 160 A Senate Judiciary report on temporary 
worker programs concluded that "[h]istory appears to indicate that 
the Bracero program only served to reduce illegal immigration 
when it was combined with both a massive law enforcement effort, 
and an expansion of the farm labor program to the point where it 
almost certainly had an adverse impact on the wages and working 
conditions of domestic workers in certain 'dominated' areas."161 
Since World War II, European countries have also sponsored 
temporary worker programs, commonly known as "guestworker 
programs." 162 These programs were initiated because oflabor short-
ages after the war.163 Although designed to be temporary, most 
programs continued into the 1970s. 164 Like the programs in the 
United States, the guestworker programs tended to stimulate illegal 
immigration and encouraged aliens to stay permanently in the host 
countries. 165 
An examination of the experiences of other temporary worker 
programs suggests that the new H2-A program will encourage il-
legal immigration. However, the value of analogizing to other pro-
grams may be questioned, because these earlier programs did not 
include employer sanctions. Strict enforcement of IRCA's employer 
sanctions provision and increased enforcement along the United 
States borders may decrease the incentives for illegal immigration. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The employer sanctions provision of IRCA is a costly one. The 
cost of the provision in increased employment discrimination far 
outweighs any minimal deterrent effect that the provision will have 
on illegal immigration. A society that has made a conscious effort 
to eliminate race discrimination cannot tolerate such a cost. 
Employer sanctions encourage employment discrimination 
against certain minority groups. Preliminary data collected by the 
159 [d. at 58. 
160 [d. 
161 [d. 
16, [d. 
163 [d. at 96. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. at 98. 
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General Accounting Office suggest that employers are increasingly 
using discriminatory practices against people who are either eligible 
for legalization or are already legal aliens. The low number of 
people filing discrimination complaints under IRCA may be mis-
leading for two reasons. First, people may be reluctant to file claims 
because they do not want to cause trouble, or they think it is not 
worthwhile to do so. Second, applicants may not realize that they 
have been discriminated against, and may not know that they can 
file a claim of discrimination against an employer. Additionally, 
under the Reagan administration's interpretation of the provision, 
those who do file complaints will find it extremely difficult to prove 
discrimination. 
Employer sanctions are not effective in controlling illegal im-
migration, because other portions of the Act implicitly encourage 
illegal immigration. The registry program, the legalization program 
and the temporary worker program all provide incentives for peo-
ple to enter the United States illegally. Drawing from past experi-
ences with temporary worker programs, the strength of these in-
centives will depend on how strictly the employer sanctions 
provisions are enforced, and how well United States borders are 
patrolled. Additionally, the economic and political situations in 
other countries will continue to have an effect on the number of 
people desiring to immigrate to the United States. 
The words of one critic of the provision aptly summarizes the 
heavy cost of employer sanctions: 
The elusive national commitment to equal opportunity is a 
dream that is only beginning to be realized by minorities in 
many sectors of the U.S. economy .... (E]mployer sanctions 
threaten that national commitment and do so in order to im-
plement a regulatory scheme that can neither function fairly or 
effectively nor accomplish its principal objective in controlling 
illegal immigration. 16n 
The social cost of employer sanctions outweighs any effect the 
provision may have on illegal immigration. In light of the cost, 
Congress should consider repealing the provision. 
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